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Abstract
Empirical evidence shows that not all countries with high levels
of corruption have su⁄ered poor growth performance. Bad quality
governance has clearly been much less damaging (if at all) in some
economies than in others. Why this is so is a question that has largely
been ignored, and the intention of this paper is to provide an answer.
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth
occurs endogenously through the invention of new goods based on re-
search and development activity. For such activity to be undertaken,
￿rms must acquire complementary licenses from public o¢ cials who
are able to exploit their monopoly power by demanding bribes in ex-
change for these (otherwise free) permits. We show that the e⁄ects of
corruption depend on the extent to which bureaucrats coordinate their
rent-seeking behaviour. Speci￿cally, our analysis predicts that coun-
tries with organised corruption networks are likely to display lower
levels of bribes, higher levels of research activity and higher rates of
growth than countries with disorganised corruption arrangements.
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vation, growth.
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11 Introduction
There is now a broad consensus amongst development experts that the qual-
ity of governance plays a vital role in shaping the fortunes of an economy.
Bad quality governance fosters corruption which can lead to ine¢ ciencies and
resource costs that impede economic progress.1 This view is supported by
a large empirical literature that has ￿ ourished over recent years as a result
of new and improved measures of corrupt activity. Armed with such data, a
number of authors have undertaken analyses which reveal that corruption has
signi￿cant adverse e⁄ects on growth (e.g., Gyimah-Brempong 2003; Keefer
and Knack 1997; Knack and Keefer 1995; Li et al. 2000; Mauro 1995; Mo
2001; Sachs and Warner 1997). These, and other, investigations have also
indicated various ways in which corruption takes hold, such as lowering rates
of investment (e.g., Mauro 1995), creating obstacles to doing business (e.g.,
World Bank 2002), reducing in￿ ows of foreign investment (e.g., Wei 2000)
and causing misallocations of public expenditures (e.g., Mauro 1997; Tanzi
and Davoodi 1997). The scale of the o⁄ences involved, and the ingenuity of
those that perpetrate them, are often quite staggering, as a wealth of anecdo-
tal evidence reveals. Given all of this, it is not surprising that most, if not all,
international development agencies have made the ￿ght against corruption a
leading, if not the foremost, priority in their agendas for alleviating poverty.2
It is undoubtedly true that many countries of the world have su⁄ered,
and continue to su⁄er, as a result of widespread misgovernance. Yet it is
also true that there are some countries for which high levels of corruption
have appeared to do little to damage growth prospects. The most prominent
examples are to be found in South-East Asia, motivating what Wedeman
(2002a) has labelled the ￿East Asian paradox￿ . Countries such as China,
Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand have all enjoyed considerable growth
in their per-capita incomes whilst enduring the reputation of being mired
with corruption. There are even some developed countries (most notably,
Italy) that share the same notoriety. Such observations suggest that there
1The most commonly-used de￿nition of corruption is the abuse of public o¢ ce for
personal gain. Governance is de￿ned rather more broadly than this, though the two
concepts are intimately connected: just as bad governance fosters corruption, so corruption
undermines good governance.
2For numerous accounts of corrupt practices and strategies for combatting them, see
the web-sites of the World Bank (www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt),
the IMF (www.imf.org/external/np/exp/facts/gov.htm), the United Nations
(www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption.htm/) and the Free Africa Foundation
(www.freeafrica.org). For broad surveys of the literature on corruption, see Bard-
han (1997), Jain (2001), Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Tanzi (1998). And for an up-to-date
review of the empirical evidence on corruption, see Lambsdor⁄ (2005).
2is more to the relationship between corruption and development than one is
typically led to believe. Indeed, it would appear that, in some instances, this
relationship is rather fragile and tenuous.
By way of illustrating the above, we present some summary statistics
in Table 1, constructed using cross-country data on growth from the Penn
World Table and cross-country data on corruption from Transparency Inter-
national.3 We report the average growth rates and average corruption ratings
over the period 1980-1999 for selected regions of the world - the lesser devel-
oped, and reputedly more corrupt, regions. As is seen, these regions share
similar corruption ratings, but their growth performances are very di⁄erent.
The sub-Saharan African and Latin American zones provide the classic ex-
amples where high corruption is accompanied by low growth.4 This is not
observed, however, for the South and South-East Asian zone. A closer look
at this region reveals some interesting features. In accordance with the ￿nd-
ings of others (e.g., Hutchcroft 1994, 2000; Khan 1998, 2000; Lee 1995, 2000;
Rock 1999, 2000; Wedeman 2002b), we may divide the region into three dis-
tinct groups of countries: the low corruption and high growth economies of
Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore; the high corruption and low growth
economies of the Philippines and South Asia; and the high corruption and
high growth economies of China, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand. Nat-
urally, the question that arises is what is so special about this last group of
countries that has enabled them to grow in spite of being saddled with poor
quality governance? How might one explain this East Asian paradox? More
generally, why might corruption be less harmful in some countries than in
others?5
3The latter of these datasets is originally given as a ￿transparency perception in-
dex￿ (TPI) which ranks countries in terms of perceived levels of corruption on a de-
creasing scale from 10 to 0. This index (which is one of the most widely-used mea-
sures of corruption) is constructed as a ￿poll of polls￿ , combining the results of ques-
tionnaire surveys sent by various organisations to networks of correspondents around
the world. As is common practice, we apply a simple transformation to obtain a
￿corruption perception index" (CPI) which measures the level of corruption on an in-
creasing scale from 0 to 10. The transformation is given by CPI value = 10 ￿
TPI value. Further details about both our corruption and growth data can be found
by visiting the appropriate web-sites, www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html] and
pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php.
4There are some notable outliers in these regions that deserve a mention. Botswana,
for example, is often heralded as Africa￿ s success story, having seemingly been able to
control corruption and enjoy high growth. Likewise, Chile has distinguished itself in Latin
America by establishing a similar track record.
5The same questions are invited from the results of some simple regressions which
paint a similar picture to the above. For example, the correlation between growth and
corruption is signifcantly negative for sub-Saharan African and Latin American countries,
3One possible answer to the above questions is related to the empirical
results of Neeman et al. (2004) who re-examine the negative relationship
between corruption and development on the basis of the degree of openness
of economies. Using a variety of model speci￿cations, it is found that this
relationship holds only for countries that are very open, especially in terms
of their ￿nancial integration with the rest of the world. For countries that
are not very well integrated, the relationship more-or-less disappears. An
obvious explanation for this is that fewer restrictions on cross-border ￿nancial
transactions makes it easier for corrupt individuals to hide their illegal income
by laundering it abroad. As such, the incentives to engage in corruption, and
the e⁄ects thereof, are likely to be much greater in this case than in a less
liberalised environment where resources cannot be syphoned o⁄ so easily.
This idea may well have some truth in it, but it does not resolve the puzzle
of the East Asian experience. As far back as the 1980s, countries such as
Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea were classi￿ed as open economies (e.g.,
Sachs and Warner 1995): yet corruption in these countries has been much
less destructive (if at all) than corruption in other nations of the world.
Another possible answer to the questions is given by the so-called ￿speed
money￿hypothesis of corruption. According to this, corrupt transactions be-
tween private and public agents are a means of circumventing cumbersome
and pervasive regulations (red tape) that are detrimental to e¢ ciency (e.g.,
Huntington 1968; Le⁄ 1964; Leys 1970). This argument - an application of
the theory of the second best - views bribery and other forms of kickback, not
as any hindrance to the economy, but as convenient devices for overcoming
institutional hurdles that distort incentives and opportunities. Whilst plau-
sible at ￿rst glance, the argument can be challenged on both conceptual and
empirical grounds. Conceptually, there are at least two main problems: ￿rst,
although bribery may speed up individual transactions with bureaucrats,
both the sizes of bribes and the number of transactions may increase so as to
produce an overall net loss in e¢ ciency; second, and more fundamentally, the
distortions that bribes are meant to mitigate are often the result of corrupt
practices to begin with and should therefore be treated as endogenous, rather
than exogenous, to the bureaucratic process. Empirically, the evidence o⁄ers
very little support to the hypothesis: in Ades and Di Tella (1997), Mauro
(1995) and Meon and Sekkat (2005) it is found that the correlation between
growth and corruption is consistently negative (and particularly strong) in
samples of countries with reputedly high levels of red tape, weak rules of law
and widespread government ine¢ ciencies (the type of environment where the
but is only so for South and South-East Asian countries when China, Indonesia, South
Korea and Thailand are excluded from the sample.
4argument is most relevant); in Kaufman and Wei (2000) it is found that the
use of bribes to speed up the bureaucratic process is largely self-defeating as
the amount of time negotiating bribes increases.
A ￿nal possible answer to the questions is suggested in the discussion
of Shleifer and Vishny (1993) on the organisation of corruption. The basic
idea has to do with the fact that, in order to conduct business, individuals
often need to procure several di⁄erent types of governmental good (licenses,
permits, certi￿cates, etc.) that are complements to each other and that are
provided by di⁄erent governmental agencies or departments. Under such
circumstances, the extent to which public o⁄cials are organised in their ex-
traction of bribes can have an important in￿ uence on the consequences of
bribery. If bureaucrats are disorganised and act as independent monopolists,
then each of them will seek to maximise his individual bribe income without
taking into account the negative e⁄ect of this on the bribe-taking capacity
of others. This e⁄ect arises since the demand for a bribe by one bureaucrat
in exchange for his own governmental good imposes a pecuniary externality
on other bureaucrats by reducing the demand for their governmental goods
and, with this, their ability to pro￿t from corruption. By contrast, if bu-
reaucrats are organised and act as a joint monopoly, then they will strive to
maximise their total bribe income and, in doing so, will internalise any exter-
nalities. In this way, a centralised network of collusive corruption can lead to
a lower level of bribe payment, a greater provision of governmental goods and
a smaller scale of distortions than would arise under a decentralised network
of non-collusive corruption.6 This argument has a good deal of merit and its
application to the East Asian experience is particularly relevant. As noted
above, this region appears to be divided into three distinct groups of coun-
tries: the ￿rst - comprising Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore - are the low
corruption and high growth economies in which corrupt practices have been
curbed by strong autonomous states; the second - consisting of the Philip-
pines and South Asia - are the high-corruption and low-growth economies in
which disorganised corrupt behaviour has ￿ ourished; and the third - consist-
ing of China, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand - are the high-corruption
6As also indicated by Shleifer and Vishny (1993), it is possible to obtain the opposite
result if governmental goods are substitutes for each other, or if the same governmental
good is provided by more than one bureaucrat. In this case competition between bu-
reaucrats in the absence of collusion could drive down the level of bribes relative to the
monopoly outcome in the presence of collusion. As noted by others, however, the condi-
tions for ensuring a competitive equilibrium (such as zero search costs for individuals in
their acquisition of information about bribe payments, and zero capacity constraints on
bureaucrats in their supply of governmental goods) are fairly stringent and not obviously
satis￿ed in practice (e.g., Bose 2004).
5and high-growth economies in which organised corrupt activity has thrived.
Some recent evidence lends support to the view that the e⁄ects of corruption
depend not only on the scale of illegal pro￿teering, but also on the nature
of this pro￿teering. In particular, it has been found that corruption reduces
investment by less when it is more predictable (more organised), and that
corruption and investment have displayed a positive correlation in the large
newly-industrialised East Asian economies that have centralised (organised)
corruption networks (e.g., Campos et al. 1999; Rock and Bonnet 2004).7
Theoretical research on the organisation of corruption has not progressed
much further since the seminal contribution by Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
An exception is the recent analysis of Celentani and Ganuza (2002) who
develop a game-theoretic model in which one group of agents (a constituency)
appoints another group of agents (bureaucrats) to ensure some prescribed
level, or quality, of activity (e.g., production) on the part of a third group
of agents (providers). The consituency is aware that a bureaucrat and a
provider may collude with each other in such a way that the former allows the
latter to engage in sub-standard activity in return for a bribe. Higher levels
of corruption prompt the constituency to set lower levels of required activity
which reduce the gains from corrupt behaviour. Against this background, it is
shown how an organised syndicate of corrupt bureaucrats would maximise its
illegal income by limiting the number of corrupt transactions, a consideration
that does not arise in a disorganised network of rent-seeking o¢ cials. As a
consequence, the incidence of corruption (quality of activity) is lower (higher)
when such a syndicate exists than when it does not.
As far as we know, the present paper is the ￿rst to study the above
types of issue from an explicitly macroeconomic perspective.8 It does so with
the view to shedding light on why the e⁄ects of corruption on growth and
development appear to be so di⁄erent across countries. Our analysis is based
on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth occurs endogenously
through the design and manufacture of new intermediate goods that are
used in the production of ￿nal output. Design (or innovation) activity is
undertaken by entrepreneurs who require various licenses from public o¢ cials
in order to embark on this activity. These licenses are complementary in
the sense that all of them must be procured - otherwise, an entrepreneur is
unable to engage in research and development. All bureaucrats are corrupt
and each one of them exploits his monopoly over the issue of a license by
7It is worth noting that such networks are also a feature of some developed economies
that have a relatively high corruption rating (e.g., Italy).
8In their seminal contribution, Ehrlich and Lui (1999) devote part of their analysis to
studying the issue, though their model is quite di⁄erent from ours and is geared towards
other (occupational choice) aspects of rent-seeking.
6demanding a bribe in exchange for it. We study the implications of this
when bureaucrats act either individualistically (disorganised corruption) or
collectively (organised corruption). We show that bribe payments are lower,
innovation activity is higher and growth is higher in the case of the latter
than in the case of the former.
We emphasise that our analysis is not meant as a prescription for the
organisation of corruption. Whether organised or not, corruption is always
bad for development in our model and the best outcome is achieved when
it does not exist at all. The precise e⁄ect of corruption is to limit entry
into productive activities, an e⁄ect that appears prevalent in many countries
where opportunities are often restricted by the illicit costs of complying with
numerous procedures and regulations.9 Corruption is often seen as a form of
taxation, though one important di⁄erence in the case of entry regulation is
that, unlike taxes, bribe payments are made before productive ventures are
embarked upon. This can deter such ventures at the outset and may bias
entry towards those most able to a⁄ord it.
To date, most theoretical research on corruption has been conducted at
the microeconomic level, using partial equilibrium models to study speci￿c
questions and issues about the nature of corrupt behaviour and the impli-
cations for e¢ ciency and welfare (e.g., Andvig and Moene 1990; Banerjee
1997; Cadot 1987; Klitgaard 1988, 1990; Rose-Ackerman 1975, 1978, 1999;
Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Much less research has been devoted towards un-
derstanding the macroeconomics of misgovernance, particularly from a devel-
opment perspective.10 Two of the ￿rst contributions in this area are credited
to Ehrlich and Lui (1999) and Sarte (2000), the former of whom demon-
strate how corruption can lead to a diversion of resources away from growth-
promoting activities (investments in human capital) towards power-seeking
activities (investments in political capital), whilst the latter of whom shows
how corruption may cause resources to be diverted away from the formal
(more e¢ cient) sectors of the economy towards the informal (less e¢ cient)
sectors. More recently, Blackburn et al. (2006) reveal how corruption and
development may interact with each other to produce threshold e⁄ects and
multiple (history-dependent) long-run equilibria, including a poverty trap
equilibrium. We establish similar results in Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio
(2007), together with demonstrating how corruption can foster inequality by
9Various examples from around the world can be found in Bhagwati (1993), De Soto
(1990), Djankov et al. (2000), Kau⁄man (1997), Mbaku (2000), Sjaifudian (1997) and the
World Bank (2002).
10In a purely static context, Acemoglu and Verdier (1998, 2000) conduct a general
equilibrium analysis of how corruption may form part of an optimal allocation in which
market failure is traded o⁄ against government failure.
7compromising the e⁄ectiveness of redistributive policy. Finally, Rivera-Batiz
(2001) illustrates the potentially adverse growth implications of ￿nancial lib-
eralisation when corruption is left unchecked. With the exception of Ehrich
and Lui (1999), none of these analyses address the issue of how di⁄erent types
of corrupt behaviour may have di⁄erent consequences for the economy.11
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we
present a description of the model. In Section 3 we solve for the general
equilibrium of the model. In Section 4 we compare and contrast the im-
plications of alternative forms of corruption. In Section 5 we make a few
conluding remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a small open economy in which there is a constant population of
two-period agents belonging to overlapping generations of dynastic families.
Agents of each generation are divided into two groups of citizens - private
individuals (or households) and public servants (or bureaucrats). The for-
mer are di⁄erentiated further into skilled and unskilled workers who supply
labour to ￿rms involved in di⁄erent production activities. The latter are
homogeneous and employed by the government in the administration of pub-
lic policy. To ￿x ideas, we normalise the size of each group of households
to 1 and set the size of the bureaucracy to S.12 Productive activity takes
place in two sectors - a ￿nal output sector in which a single consumption
good (the numeraire of the economy) is manufactured, and an intermediate
input sector in which a variety of di⁄erentiated producer goods are created.13
At any point in time, t, there is a ￿xed unit mass of ￿nal output ￿rms, an
endogenously-determined number, Mt, of existing intermediate input ￿rms
and an endogenously-determined number, Nt, of potentially new intermedi-
ate input ￿rms. Each type of intermediate input is indexed by i 2 (0;Mt),
11To focus on this issue, our analysis abstracts from the potential endogeneity of cor-
ruption, as studied by Blackburn et al. (2006) and Blackburn and Blackburn and Forgues-
Puccio (2007). Rather, we follow the approach of others (e.g., Rivera-Batiz 2001; Sarte
2000) by taking as given the absence or presence of corrupt behaviour, and comparing the
implications of these di⁄erent scenarios.
12As in other analyses (e.g., Blackburn et al. 2006; Rivera-Batiz 2001; Sarte 2000),
we abstract from issues relating to occupational choice by assuming that individuals are
separated exogenously at birth according to their skills or through some random selection
process. In doing so we are able to simplify the analysis by not having to consider possible
changes in the size of the bureaucracy and possible changes in the level of corruption that
may result from this.
13Implicit in our analysis is the assumption that intermediate goods are non-tradeable.
8with Mt representing the most recently invented variety. Invention occurs
through research and development by each of the Nt new entrepreneurs, a
venture that is risky and that requires licenses from all public o¢ cials to
be undertaken. Successful research and development leads to an expansion
in the number of intermediate goods which raises e¢ ciency in output pro-
duction and provides the mechanism for endogenous growth. All markets
are perfectly competitive, except the market for intermediate inputs which
is characterised by monopolistic competition.
2.1 Agents
Each agent (a private or public citizen) works only when young and consumes
only when old. An agent is born with one unit of labour endowment which
he supplies inelastically to his particular occupation in return for a wage.
This, and any other, income is saved at the exogenously given world rate of
interest, r. All agents are risk neutral, deriving linear utility from retirement
consumption which is ￿nanced from savings. This simple set-up of agents￿
circumstances is chosen largely for convenience and to focus attention on
the production side of the economy. Aside from rent-seeking activity on the
part of public o¢ cials, the behaviour of agents is relatively unimportant and
can essentially be ignored in the determination of equilibrium growth in the
economy.
2.2 Final Output Firms
The representative ￿rm engaged in ￿nal manufacturing combines lt units of
unskilled labour with xt(i) units of intermediate good i to produce yt units
of consumption good according to
yt = Al
1￿￿
t
Z Mt
0
xt(i)
￿di; (1)
(A > 0;￿ 2 (0;1)). The ￿rm hires labour from households at the wage rate
wt and rents each intermediate input from the producer of that input at the
price pt(i). Pro￿t maximisation implies the following factor demands:
lt =
(1 ￿ ￿)yt
wt
; (2)
xt(i) =
￿yt
MtPt
￿
pt(i)
Pt
￿ 1
￿￿1
: (3)
where Pt =
h
1
M(t)
R M(t)
0 pt(j)
￿
￿￿1dj
i ￿￿1
￿
.
92.3 Intermediate Input Firms
An intermediate good is created from a design, or blueprint, that arises
out of successful innovation by ￿rms engaged in research and development
activity. By way of ensuring the existence of such activity, we assume that
any ￿rm which innovates has a perpetual monopoly right over the use of its
design (i.e., over the manufacture and sale of its newly-invented product).
No other ￿rm can ever exploit the same design to produce the same type of
intermediate good.14 Given this, then any ￿rm that innovates can expect to
make positive pro￿ts each period so that the incentive to undertake research
and development is always preserved.
Research is conducted using skilled labour and previously accumulated,
generally available knowledge. We denote by ht(j) the amount of labour
employed by the jth research ￿rm and approximate the currently available
stock of disembodied knowledge by the existing stock of designs, Mt. Each
￿rm then has et(j) = ht(j)Mt e¢ ciency units of input with which to under-
take its research. The technology for doing this is described by the function
q(et(j)) which gives the probability of successful innovation (i.e., the prob-
ability of designing a new product). We assume that this function satis￿es
the following properties: q0(￿) > 0 and q00(￿) < 0 (concavity); q(0) ￿ 0 and
limet(j)!1 q(￿) ￿ 1 (boundedness); and et(j)q0(￿) < q(￿) (elasticity less than
one). The ￿rst property implies that there are diminishing returns to re-
search. As in other analyses (e.g., Blackburn and Hung 1998; Blackburn
et al. 2000; Jones 1995a; Stokey 1995), this feature is intended to capture
the notion of ￿ crowding￿ , meaning the duplication of research e⁄ort in the
presence of a limited stock of ideas: that is, a doubling of research input
need not result in a doubling of research output because some of the re-
search may be redundant. The second property is simply a requirement that
the probability of successful innovation lies in the unit interval. And the
third property ensures the existence of a unique equilibrium with positive
innovation activity.15
For research to be undertaken, a ￿rm must acquire licenses from public
14For simplicity, we suppose that both the invention and production of an intermediate
good are undertaken by the same ￿rm. Equivalently, one could assume separate sectors of
innovators and manufacturers, with the former selling their designs to the latter.
15This last property is necessarily satis￿ed if, in addition to the other properties, q0(0)
is some ￿nite value. It is worth noting that our choice of research technology is based
not only on its apparent plausibility, but also on its advantages over more simple (linear)
speci￿cations that are often used. Such speci￿cations imply an indeterminate number
of research ￿rms, do not accord very well with the notion of a bounded probability of
innovating, and inevitably give rise to questionable scale e⁄ects (e.g., Blackburn and Hung
1998; Blackburn et al. 2000; Jones 1995a,b).
10o¢ cials. These licenses, or permits, are complementary in the sense that
all of them are required, though each one is issued separately by a di⁄erent
bureaucrat. In the absence of any rent-seeking, licenses are issued free of
charge. In the presence of rent-seeking, licenses are granted only in exchange
for bribes. Let b denote the bribe paid by a ￿rm to a bureaucrat in return
for a particular license. The determination of b is an issue to which we turn
later.16 Since each and every bureaucrat demands such a kickback, the total
amount of bribe payment that the ￿rm must make is B = Sb. Having made
this payment, the ￿rm can then engage in research activity by incurring a
￿xed cost of ￿ units of output and hiring skilled labour at the wage rate Wt.
Given the above, we may deduce the expected net payo⁄from innovation.
Let ￿t(j) be the per-period pro￿t that a ￿rm could earn from designing and
selling a new intermediate good. With probability q(￿), the ￿rm succeeds in
its research and is entitled to the entire future stream of these pro￿ts. With
probability 1￿q(￿), the ￿rm fails in its research and earns nothing. It follows
that the expected net return to the ￿rm is
Vt(j) = q(et(j))
1 X
￿=1
(1 + r)
￿￿￿t+￿(j) ￿
Wt
Mt
et(j) ￿ ￿ ￿ B: (4)
There are two separate problems confronting the ￿rm. The ￿rst is to
choose a level of labour input, ht(j), that maximises its expected payo⁄ in
(4). The solution to this is
Mtq
0(et(j))
1 X
￿=1
(1 + r)
￿￿￿t+￿(j) = Wt: (5)
The second problem is to choose a price for its product, pt(j), that max-
imises its operating pro￿ts, ￿t(j). It does this by acting as a monopolistic
competitor, taking into account the e⁄ect of its price on the demand for its
product in (3). We assume that, once invented, an intermediate good costs
￿ units of output to produce. Consequently, ￿t(j) = [pt(j)￿￿]xt(j) and the
optimal price is given by the standard constant mark-up rule,
pt(j) = p =
￿
￿
: (6)
3 General Equilibrium
The solution of the model is a symmetric, dynamic general equilibrium in
which the economy evolves along a balanced, endogenous growth path. As
16As we show at that time, the optimal value of bribes chosen by bureaucrats is, indeed,
a constant (i.e., bt = b for all t).
11indicated previously, growth occurs through an expansion in the number of
intermediate inputs as a result of research and development. The equilibrium
is computed by using the results obtained so far in conjunction with certain
other relationships, as outlined below.
Symmetry arises by virtue of (6) which shows that the price of each
and every intermediate good is the same (and constant). This implies an
aggregate price of Pt = p as well. Since equilibrium in the market for unskilled
labour requires lt = 1, it follows from (1), (2) and (3) that
yt = Ax
￿Mt; (7)
wt = (1 ￿ ￿)yt; (8)
xi(i) = x =
￿
￿2A
￿
￿ 1
1￿￿
: (9)
The expressions in (7) and (8) imply that both the level of ￿nal output
and the wages of unskilled labour grow at the same rate as the number of
intermediate goods. The expression in (9) shows that the quantity demanded
of each intermediate good is identical (and constant).
Given the above, then each intermediate goods ￿rm makes the same ￿xed
amount of operating pro￿ts, ￿t(j) = ￿ = (p ￿ ￿)x. Consequently,
P1
￿=1(1 +
r)￿￿￿t+￿(j) = ￿
r. In addition, free entry into research and development drives
the expected net payo⁄in (4) to zero. Together with (5), these results imply
that each ￿rm engaged in research and development uses the same ￿xed
amount of research input, et(j) = e, as determined by
[q(e) ￿ eq
0(e)]￿ = r(￿ + B): (10)
From this we may deduce the following.
Lemma 1 Given that lime!0[q(￿) ￿ eq0(￿)]￿ < r(￿ + B), 9 an e = "(B) > 0
such that "0(￿) > 0.
Proof. De￿ne Q(e) = q(￿)￿eq0(￿). Since Q0(￿) = ￿eq00(￿) > 0, then provided
that lime!0 Q(￿)￿ < r(￿ + B), 9 a unique value of e > 0 that satis￿es
Q(e)￿ = r(￿ + B). Hence e = "(B), where "0(￿) = r
Q0(￿)￿ > 0.
The expression in (10) determines the equilibrium level of research input,
e, as an increasing function of the bribe payment, B. We shall return to this
shortly. For the moment, we note that (10) may be interpreted equivalently
as determining the number of new designers, Nt, for any given number of
existing designs, Mt. To be sure, observe that, since ht(j) = ht, equilibrium
12in the market for skilled labour requires Ntht = 1 so that e = Mt
Nt . As
noted above, the term [q(￿) ￿ eq0(￿)] in (10) is an increasing function of e or,
equivalently, a decreasing function of Nt.17 Given this, then neither [q(￿) ￿
eq0(￿)]￿ > r(￿ + B) nor [q(￿) ￿ eq0(￿)]￿ < r(￿ + B) can be an equilibrium
outcome. In the ￿rst case the existence of positive pro￿ts would lead more
￿rms to enter the research sector, implying that Nt would increase until the
condition held with equality. In the second case the prospect of negative
pro￿ts would cause some ￿rms to leave the research sector so that Nt would
decrease until the condition held with equality again. Evidently, the fact
that e is a constant means that Nt must grow at the same rate as Mt. The
same can be said about the wages of skilled labour since (5) yields
Mtq
0(e)￿ = rWt: (11)
It remains to determine the equilibrium growth rate, itself. Given that
the probability of successful of innovation is independent across designers,
then the ￿ ow of new designs is Mt+1 ￿ Mt = q(￿)Nt. Denoting the growth
rate of new designs by gt =
Mt+1￿Mt
Mt , we arrive at the following result.
Lemma 2 Given Lemma 1, the economy exhibits a constant equilibrium
growth rate of g = ￿(e) > 0, where ￿0(￿) < 0.
Proof. Using e = Mt
Nt , it follows that gt = g =
q(e)
e ￿ ￿(e), where e is
determined in Lemma 1. Hence ￿0(￿) =
eq0(￿)￿q(￿)
e2 < 0.
As shown already, g is the growth rate for all other (non-stationary) variables
as well. In the absence of any transitional dynamics, the economy evolves
perpetually over time in a steady state, balanced growth equilibrium char-
acterised by an increasing variety of intermediate goods associated with an
increasing number of ￿rms engaged in research and development.
The equilibrium growth rate in (12) depends only on the quantity of re-
search input, e, which is determined according to (10). The constancy of e
explains why long-run growth is sustainable in spite of there being dimin-
ishing returns in the research technology. As the economy expands, there
is an increase in the number of intermediate goods and an increase in the
number of ￿rms engaged in innovation. Each of these ￿rms is able to exploit
a wider range of ideas (because of the externalities from research), whilst
being led to operate at a smaller scale (because of the greater competition
for skilled labour). The upshot is that the probability of successful innova-
tion remains constant and that the economy, as a whole, experiences greater
17Note also that the term, itself, is positively-valued by our earlier assumptions.
13research activity which enables it to sustain a constant growth rate of new
designs.
4 Corruption and Growth
Corruption in our model takes the form of bribes paid by ￿rms to bureaucrats
in exchange for licenses to undertake research and development. One may
think of bureaucrats as being able to extract bribes by being able to sim-
ply reject license applications outright, or to delay the applications process
(which can be crucial for innovation), if ￿rms are not willing to comply with
their demands. We assume that bureaucrats can do this without any risk
of detection or punishment. This assumption (used in other analyses) is in-
tended primarily as a simpli￿cation, though it is probably near the mark for
many developing countries where the will and wherewithal to combat cor-
ruption are relatively weak.18 The way that bribe-taking in￿ uences growth,
and the way that this depends on how bribes are chosen, are the two issues
that occupy the remainder of our analysis.
The total bribe payment that a ￿rm has to pay in order to engage in
research activity is given by B. This payment acts like an additional ￿xed
cost to the ￿rm and the e⁄ect of it on growth is realised straightforwardly as
follows.
Proposition 1 An increase in the level of bribes reduces equilibrium growth.
Proof. From Lemmas 1 and 2, the equilibrium growth rate can be written
as g = ￿("(B)) ￿ ￿(B). Hence ￿0(￿) = ￿0(￿)"0(￿) < 0.
This result arises because an increase in bribe payments increases the costs
of research and development, causing a reduction in the number of ￿rms
that are willing to embark on such a venture. Whilst each ￿rm, individually,
operates at a higher scale, the economy, as a whole, su⁄ers a decline in
research activity. In short, corruption impedes growth by limiting entry into
18Even when governments strive to be vigilant, corruption may thrive for a number of
reasons, such as the prohibitive costs of ￿ghting it when resources are scarce, the inherent
di¢ culties in detecting it when monitoring is imprecise and the innate problems in exposing
it when monitoring is abused. The last of these possibilities (where those appointed as
vigilance o¢ cers are themselves open to bribes) bears on the interesting and complex
issue of corruption in hierarchies (e.g., Basu et al. 1992; Marjit and Shi 1998; Mishra
2002). From a normative perspective, it has been shown by Bose (2004) how imperfect
vigilance, combined with direct penalties for bribe-taking, may lead to outcomes that are
Pareto-inferior to those that would occur if no sanctions were applied at all.
14the business of innovation. There is, of course, an obvious implication of this.
Corollary 1 The growth rate of a corrupt economy is always lower than the
growth rate of a non-corrupt economy.
Proof. The growth rate is g = ￿(B). Since ￿0(￿) < 0, then ￿(B) < ￿(0) for
any B > 0.
Having established the above, we now consider how bribe payments,
themselves, are determined. Recall that B = Sb, where S is the number
of bureaucrats and b is the bribe that each bureaucrat demands. We study
two alternative scenarios: the ￿rst - disorganised corruption - is when each
bureaucrat acts as an independent monopolist, choosing a level of bribe that
maximises his own illegal income without consideration of the aggregate im-
plications of bribe-taking. The second - organised corruption - is when the
bureaucracy, as a whole, acts as a joint monopoly, choosing a level of bribe
that maximises the illegal income of all (or each) of its members and ac-
knowledging the aggregate e⁄ects of its behaviour. In both cases we assume
that bureaucrats, whilst never being caught, incur some costs from their cor-
rupt activities. These costs may be thought of in a number of ways. For
example, corrupt public o¢ cials may need to spend e⁄ort and resources on
arranging and concealing their illicit transactions, and may also experience
some moral shame or social stigma from abusing their privileged positions.
It is plausible to imagine that these costs are higher the larger is the scale of
the particular o⁄ence. We capture this conveniently in terms of a convex cost
function that is increasing in the amount of bribe extracted from each ￿rm.
This function is given by ￿(b) which is further assumed to satisfy ￿(￿) = b at
both b = 0 and some b = b￿ > 0. These properties ensure that, at least upto
some level of bribe, a bureaucrat￿ s net payo⁄ from bribe-taking is positive
(i.e., b ￿ ￿(￿) > 0 for b 2 [0;b￿]).19 The bureaucrat￿ s total net payo⁄ from
rent-seeking is given by It = Nt[b ￿ ￿(￿)], or
It = Mt
￿
b ￿ ￿(b)
e
￿
(12)
Evidently, for any given Mt, It is maximised by maximising the term in [￿].
Recall from above that corruption has the e⁄ect of reducing the number of
research ￿rms, Nt, causing an increase in research input, e, but an overall
reduction in growth. In other words, a higher demand for bribes implies a
19This follows from the convexity of ￿(￿), implying that ￿
0(￿) > 0 and ￿
00(￿) > 0. In
addition, ￿
0(0) < 1 and ￿
0(b￿) > 1.
15lower bribe base. The di⁄erence between disorganised and organised corrup-
tion lies in the extent to which bureaucrats take account of this e⁄ect when
choosing their optimal bribes.
When corruption is disorganised, each bureaucrat chooses his own level of
bribes, b, taking as given the bribes demanded by others and hence the total
bribe payment, B, that each ￿rm has to make. In doing so, each bureaucrat
perceives that his own corrupt behaviour has no in￿ uence on Nt and therefore
e. The optimal bribe in this case - denoted bD - is given simply by
￿
0(b
D) = 1: (13)
It follows from the properties of ￿(￿) that bD < b￿ and therefore bD￿￿(bD) >
0.20
When corruption is organised, the collective bureaucracy recognises that
the total bribe payment of a ￿rm depends on the amount of bribe paid to
each of its members: that is, it appreciates the fact that B = Sb. As such,
the bureaucracy is aware that its choice of b will in￿ uence Nt and therefore e.
One may think of the bureaucracy as making this choice so as to maximise
the individual payo⁄ of its representive member, or the aggregate payo⁄ of
all of its members. Either way, the optimal bribe in this case - denoted bO -
satis￿es
"(Sb
O)[1 ￿ ￿
0(b
O)] ￿ S"
0(Sb
O)[b
O ￿ ￿(b
O)] = 0: (14)
As above, bO < b￿ so that bO ￿ ￿(bO) > 0:21
A comparison of (13) and (14) leads to the following result.
Proposition 2 The level of bribes under organised corruption is lower than
the level of bribes under disorganised corruption.
Proof. Recall that "0(￿) > 0, together with bD ￿ ￿(bD) > 0 and bO > ￿(bO).
Suppose that bO ￿ bD. Then (13) would imply ￿
0(bO) ￿ 1, in which case (14)
would require S"0(SbO)[bO ￿￿(bO)] ￿ 0 which is never satis￿ed. Hence bO ￿
bD cannot be true. Suppose, alternatively, that bO < bD. Then (13) would
imply ￿
0(bO) < 1, in which case (14) would require S"0(SbO)[bO ￿￿(bO)] > 0
which is satis￿ed. Hence bO < bD is the only feasible outcome.
The intuition for this result is that an organised bureaucracy internalises the
negative externalities that arise from individualistic (non-coordinated) rent-
seeking behaviour. That is, the bureaucracy takes account of the fact that
20It also follows that the optimal bribe is constant, as claimed earlier.
21That bO < b￿ may be seen from (14) which implies that a bureaucrat￿ s payo⁄ is
decreasing at b￿ (since ￿
0(b￿) > 1 and b￿ = ￿(b￿)). It is also evident that the optimal
bribe is constant in this case as well.
16an increase in the amount of bribe payment to each of its members reduces
the number of ￿rms from which bribes can be extracted. The e⁄ect of this is
to temper the demand for bribes, an e⁄ect that is absent when bureaucracts
act alone and treat the number of potential bribe payers as given.
Given the above, it is straightforward to deduce the di⁄erent growth
implications of alternative forms of corruption.
Proposition 3 Growth is higher under organised corruption than under dis-
organised corruption.
Proof. The growth rate is g = ￿(B), where ￿0(￿) < 0. Since BO < BD, then
￿(BO) > ￿(BD).
The fact that bribe payments are lower when corruption is organised than
when it is disorganised means that the ￿xed cost of research and development
is also lower in the case of the former than in the case of the latter. A lower
cost of research encourages a greater number of ￿rms to undertake research
activity and thereby leads to a higher growth rate.
We emphasise that our analysis is not meant as a prescription for the
organisation of corruption to be a policy objective. Whether organised or
not, corruption is always bad for growth in our model and the best policy
is to eliminate it altogether. What our analysis does show, however, is that
the e⁄ects of corruption may be very di⁄erent under di⁄erent circumstances,
which may help to explain why some countries of the world appear more
immune than others to equally poor quality levels of governance.
5 Conclusions
Corruption can take many shapes and shapes and forms, and it would be
surprising if all types of corrupt activity had the same e⁄ect on economic
performance. Recent empirical evidence indicates that, whilst many coun-
tries have su⁄ered signi￿cantly as a result of corruption, others have coped
well (in some cases, very well) with the phenomenon. The foregoing analysis
suggests that one explanation for this is the extent to which perpetrators of
corrupt practices - in our case, bureaucrats - coordinate their behaviour. In
the absence of an organised corruption network, each bureaucrat demands
his own bribe payment whilst ignoring the negative externalities of this on
the bribe-taking capacity of others. In the presence of such a network, the
collective bureaucracy internalises these externalities and, in doing so, tem-
pers the demand for bribes. The result is that bribe payments are lower,
17innovation is higher and growth is higher in the case of the latter than in the
case of the former.
Like almost all other analyses, our approach has been to focus on the
e⁄ects of corruption, taking as given that corruption exists (in one form or
another). We have not sought to examine how the incidence of corruption,
itself, may change endogenously with other changes in the economic environ-
ment. This is not necessarily a major shortcoming: aside from the speci￿c
objective of our analysis (which is to draw attention to the di⁄erence between
organised and disorganised rent-seeking), there is the widely-held view that,
for many developing countries, corruption has become so ingrained into the
fabric of society that it is unlikely to disappear quickly or easily (if at all).
From the perspective of the present paper, the interesting question is not
so much why the level of corruption is higher in poor countries than in rich
countries, but rather why the nature of corruption appears to vary across
countries. The extent to which corruption is organised is one aspect of this,
but there are other aspects as well. For example, it is common practice in
some countries for arrangements to be made whereby kickbacks from pri-
vate individuals to public o¢ cials are given ex post (as a share of pro￿ts,
for instance), rather than ex ante (as an upfront bribe, like in the present
analysis); and the presumption is that the e⁄ects on the economy will be dif-
ferent in each case. The precise reason why corruption should take one form
and not another is an important issue which has been largely neglected and
which may well have just as much to do with cultural, social and political
considerations as it has with economic circumstances.
The implication of our analysis that corruption is always bad for growth
accords with the consensus view among development experts. As we have
also shown, however, exactly how bad the e⁄ect is can depend on the partic-
ular way in which corruption is practised, and there are clearly some types of
practice that are less detrimental than others. Given this, then our analysis
may be seen as o⁄ering a cautionary note against anti-corruption strategies.
If ￿ghting corrupt behaviour is costly (i.e., uses up resources that could have
been employed more productively elsewhere), and if such behaviour is not
that harmful, then one ought to be wary of embarking on a ￿ght merely
for the sake of it. Anti-corruption agencies need to analyse and understand
the nature of corruption before trying to cure it, just as a medical prac-
tioner needs to examine and identify the symptoms of a sick patient before
prescribing the appropriate remedy.
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